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Foreword
Welcome to the latest volume of the Legal Education Review.
We are proud to be Australasia’s leading source of legal education 
scholarship and one of the principal sites for academic discussion 
and debate about legal education issues. This volume of the Legal 
Education Review, Volume 24, is made up of ten articles that 
explore a variety of legal education topics.  
The first three articles are concerned with the roles of place and 
power within legal education. In ‘Educating Law Students for 
Rural and Regional Legal Practice: Embedding Place 
Consciousness in Law Curricula’, Amanda Kennedy and 
colleagues from eight Australian law schools offer a way to 
address the declining rates of recruitment and retention of lawyers 
in rural and regional Australia. Research from other disciplines 
indicates that the challenges inherent in rural and regional 
professional practice can be alleviated, and benefits more easily 
harnessed, via a place-conscious discipline-specific curriculum 
that sensitises tertiary students to, and prepares them for, the rural 
and regional career context. Amanda and her colleagues argue that 
there is scope to incorporate ‘place’ within legal education, and 
they document an innovative curriculum development project that 
embeds place consciousness within the law curriculum. They 
describe how the project team designed a curriculum package that 
aims to sensitise students to the rural and regional legal practice 
context, and equip them with the skills to take advantage of the 
opportunities available in a rural or regional professional career. 
Next, Heather Douglas and Monica Taylor in ‘Understanding 
the Power of Law: Engaging Students in Criminal Law Casework’ 
draw on students’ evaluations and reflections to describe and 
evaluate a new legal clinic, the Criminal Law Matters Legal Clinic 
at the University of Queensland. They present an approach 
informed by the work of Carol Smart to encourage students to 
critique the power of law, and examine the ways in which the 
clinic prompts students to engage in a deeper critical 
understanding of power in the context of their clients’ 
circumstances and their role as ‘lawyers’.  
The third article is by Angela Melville, and is titled ‘Barriers to 
Entry into Law School: An Examination of Socio-Economic and 
Indigenous Disadvantage’. Angela argues that the Australian legal 
profession persistently remains the domain of the white 
middle-class. She identifies the barriers to entering and completing 
law school that act to prevent people from low SES backgrounds 
and Indigenous people from entering the legal profession. These 
barriers have persisted despite a long history of policies aimed at 
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diversifying Australia’s university student population. Angela 
considers the various strategies that have been relied upon by 
universities to increase the proportion of students from 
disadvantaged backgrounds, and argues that many of the strategies 
that are most heavily relied upon are based on false common-sense 
assumptions rather than empirical evidence. 
The next three articles in this volume examine the importance 
of general legal skills and capabilities. In ‘Thinking like a Lawyer 
Ethically: Narrative Intelligence and Emotion’, Lesley Townsley 
describes and evaluates the implementation and embedding of 
‘ethics and professional responsibility’ as a graduate attribute into 
two subjects at the University of Technology Sydney. Her focus is 
upon the ways in which law students are taught to ‘think like a 
lawyer’ and make legal decisions that require ethical judgment, 
with a particular emphasis upon the development of narrative 
intelligence and the emotional content of ethical judgment.  
In ‘Employer Perspectives on Essential Knowledge, Skills and 
Attributes for Law Graduates to Work in a Global Context’, 
Duncan Bentley and Joan Squelch present the results of a 
qualitative research project to assess employer perspectives on 
required graduate knowledge, skills and attributes. There is broad 
consensus among legal academics and practitioners that law 
schools need to deliver law programs that take cognisance of 
global developments and the increasing emphasis on 
internationalisation. Duncan and Joan ask how internationalisation 
is affecting what employers want from Australian law graduates 
and consequently what those law graduates need from their legal 
education both to secure jobs and to be as effective as possible as 
new employees, from the employers’ perspective. Their findings 
provide a useful basis for law schools in the review, development 
and renewal of their own law curricula. 
Carolyn Penfold in ‘Developing Legal Communication Skills 
in a South Pacific Context’ explains how the Law School of the 
University of the South Pacific is working to develop graduates 
who are ‘able to communicate in ways that are effective, 
appropriate and persuasive for legal and non-legal audiences’ and 
argues that both identifying the content of such communication 
skills, and the learning and teaching of them, require teachers to 
pay close attention to the context of the South Pacific environment. 
She concludes that while English language skills are important, 
skills in other languages and cross cultural communication skills 
are equally important for South Pacific lawyers.  
Continuing the emphasis upon global contexts, Tihomir 
Mijatov in ‘Why and How to Internationalise Law Curriculum 
Content’ reappraises the justifications and the methods for 
implementation of internationalisation. He insists that it is only if 
institutions can be persuaded that internationalisation is valuable 
that they will consider changing their curricula. Tihomir presents 
arguments in support of the notion that internationalisation is 
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valuable, and proceeds to identify ways in which curriculum 
content can actually be internationalised.  
The next article by Susannah Sage Jacobsen and Tania Leiman 
is timely give the increasing emphasis upon the embedding of 
clinical experiences within legal education. In ‘Identifying 
Teaching and Learning Opportunities within Professional 
Relationships between Clinic Supervisors’, they present the results 
of a critical evaluation of the Flinders Legal Advice Clinic, a small 
University student-staffed legal service based in the outer southern 
suburbs of Adelaide. An ‘Appreciative Inquiry’ process was used 
to evaluate the Clinic in 2013, and this identified a distinctive 
learning opportunity emerging within the strong relationships 
between the supervising solicitors. Susannah and Tania consider 
how recognising the nature, significance and value of the 
interactions and relationships between law supervisors in a student 
legal clinic can be instrumental in creating unique occasions for 
learning from practice. 
The last two articles in this volume are concerned with legal 
research and research networks. Theunis Roux in ‘Judging the 
Quality of Legal Research: A Qualified Response to the Demand 
for Greater Methodological Rigour’ describes how legal 
academics’ drive over the last 40 years to broaden their research 
horizons has exposed the quality of their research to 
extra-disciplinary scrutiny. Theunis argues that legal academics 
urgently need to respond to these developments, but that the way 
they respond depends on the distinction between traditional 
doctrinal research and the other types of legal research that have 
emerged over the last 40 years.  The challenge in the former case 
is to defend doctrinal research against the charge that, as a form of 
applied social science research, its practitioners should conform to 
the research standards applicable in that set of disciplines. In the 
case of the other types of legal research that have emerged over the 
last 40 years, legal academics do need to conform to the research 
standards of the disciplines on which they are drawing.  This is 
especially true of the particular variant of socio-legal research that 
legal academics produce, which mixes the internal perspective of 
the trained lawyer with the external perspective of the social 
sciences, but it is also true of the other main categories of legal 
research, including ‘law and __’ research, legal philosophy, 
comparative legal research and critical approaches.   
Finally, in ‘Towards Growth and Sustainability: The 
Institutional and Disciplinary Dynamics of Postgraduate Law 
Research Groups’, Felicity Bell,  Rita Shackel and Linda Steele 
explain that while there is growing attention in the educational 
literature on the role of postgraduate student research groups in 
Higher Degree Research (HDR) student learning and experience, 
there is little research specifically on law HDR students, including 
research on the factors key to successful development and 
sustainability of HDR groups in law.  Felicity, Rita and Linda 
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consider how academic involvement in these groups might be both 
limiting and productive and ask how the contours of legal 
scholarly inquiry might impact students’ engagement in an 
inter-disciplinary HDR group and its sustainability. They conclude 
that while impermanence is a particular challenge given the 
transient nature of student populations and the sometimes onerous 
administrative burden placed on coordinators of groups, the 
development of academic independence in students is vital to 
achieving sustainability.  
This volume of the Legal Education Review would not have 
been possible without the contributions of many committed 
academics, most of whom volunteered their time and expertise. 
Thanks are especially due to the members of the 2014 Editorial 
Committee for their hard work in bringing this volume together. 
Last year saw some important changes to the composition of the 
Editorial Committee. Wendy Larcombe (University of Melbourne) 
resigned from the Committee, and Associate Editor Anne Hewitt 
(University of Adelaide) took a leave of absence. The remaining 
members were Kate Galloway (James Cook University), Sonya 
Willis (University of Sydney), Allan Chay (Queensland University 
of Technology), Donna Buckingham (University of Otago) and 
Matthew Ball (Queensland University of Technology). I would 
like to thank all of them for their dedication, loyalty and 
commitment to the journal.  
The other major change in 2014 related to the home of the 
Legal Education Review. In July 2014 the administrative base of 
the journal moved to Bond University. I would like to thank our 
former Administrator, Alysia Saker, for her many years of hard 
work, and welcome to the journal our new Administrator, Paula 
Hudson, who has for the past six months managed to successfully 
navigate a steep learning curve and now ensures that the Legal 
Education Review is administered to its usual high standards. It 
was Paula’s hard work that ensured this volume successfully 
reached publication. I would also like to thank Helen Anderson, 
ALTA Treasurer, for her careful management of the journal’s 
finances, and the ALTA Executive Committee for their ongoing 
financial support and encouragement. 
Following the move to Bond University, the proofreading and 
typesetting for the journal now take place ‘in-house’. I would like 
to thank our former typesetter Maureen Platt and our former 
proof-reader Trischa Manna at Inkshed Press, both of whom for 
many years worked closely with the Editorial Committee to ensure 
all of the articles in the journal were presented at an appropriately 
high standard. Maureen, in fact, has worked with the journal since 
its first volume 25 years ago and has made an important 
contribution to the success of the journal.  
All of the articles in the Legal Education Review are double 
blind refereed. Our referees spend many hours reading and 
providing insightful feedback on our articles, and their efforts are 
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genuinely appreciated by both the editors and the authors. We are 
also grateful for the support of our Editorial Advisory Board, the 
members of which often serve as referees and provide overall 
guidance on the direction of the journal. The list of illustrious 
scholars and practitioners on our Advisory Board has this year 
been expanded to include former Editorial Committee member 
Wendy Larcombe. 
The Legal Education Review has recently issued a call for 
submissions to Volume 25 of the journal, to be published in late 
2015. Issue 1 will be a General Issue containing research articles 
on current issues in legal education from all jurisdictions. Issue 2 
will be a Special Issue entitled ‘Why do we do what we do? 
Re-evaluating the purpose of law school’. We are encouraging 
academics to submit scholarly articles that explore this theme by 
critically analysing and evaluating the goals of contemporary legal 
education. Potential topics include (1) career paths for law 
graduates; (2) knowing the law versus practising the law; (3) why 
so many law graduates choose not to practise law; and (4) whether 
all law schools should prioritise preparation for practice. 
Submissions are open until 30 May 2015. Please refer to the Legal 
Education Review website for more details: www.ler.edu.au.  
Professor Nick James 
Editor-in-Chief
THINKING LIKE A LAWYER ETHICALLY: 




The Faculty of Law at the University of Technology Sydney 
(UTS) recently developed a new curriculum for both the Bachelor 
of Laws and the Juris Doctor. The new curriculum is designed, in 
part, to embed graduate attributes more pervasively across these 
degrees, allowing students to develop skills and acquire knowledge 
incrementally.
1
 One of these graduate attributes is ‘ethics and 
professional responsibility’, and the development of the new 
curriculum has provided the opportunity to assess and develop the 
content of legal ethics education. This article reflects upon the 
embedding of the ethics graduate attribute into two UTS subjects: 
Ethics and Professional Conduct and Evidence and Criminal 
Procedure. The focus is upon one aspect of the way in which law 
students are taught to ‘think like a lawyer’ and make legal 
decisions that require ethical judgment: specifically, narrative 
intelligence and the emotional content of ethical judgment.  
Two teaching and learning strategies to incorporate knowledge 
about emotion into the curriculum are explained. The purpose of 
the strategy in Ethics and Professional Conduct is to equip 
students with an understanding of the impact of emotions on 
ethical judgment and the need for emotional self-awareness. The 
purpose of the strategy in Evidence and Criminal Procedure is to 
equip students with an understanding of the ethical implications of 
the ways in which lawyers use emotion persuasively and tactically 
to influence juror judgment. In this respect, the article contributes 
to how legal academics can develop in students the theoretical 
understanding and professional skills required for ethical practice. 
*  Lesley Townsley, Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of Technology, 
Sydney. I would like to thank the referees for their comments and suggested 
improvements. I also thank Professor Anita Stuhmcke for providing feedback 
on earlier drafts.
1  There are six graduate attributes: (1) legal knowledge; (2) ethics and 
professional responsibility; (3) critical analysis and evaluation; (4) research 
skills; (5) communication and collaboration; and (6) self-management. The 
attributes were formulated to accord with the six Teaching and Learning 
Outcomes endorsed by the Council of Australian Law Deans in March 2012.  
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In the legal domain, emotion is generally viewed as having an 
irrational effect on judgment and therefore as something that 
should be excluded. However disciplines which offer cognitive 
theories of emotion, such as philosophy,2 psychology,3 and 
neuroscience,4 challenge this view. These disciplines regard 
emotions as involving evaluative judgments that can be either 
appropriate or inappropriate, and thus as either assisting or 
impeding judgment. Understanding the evaluations contained in 
emotion leads to better self-awareness and the ability to educate 
oneself about emotional capacities and responses. With this 
awareness, decision-makers are better able to account for both the 
positive and the negative influences of emotion on judgment, 
including ethical judgment. This article applies cognitive accounts 
of emotion from contemporary philosophy in order to demonstrate 
how emotions can be analysed in a way that leads to better self-
awareness and the ability to evaluate the moral justifiability of 
certain emotions. 
Law and emotion scholarship seeks to demonstrate the 
interrelationship between law and emotion5 and between legal 
education and emotion.6 Abrams and Keren describe the legal 
2  See Robert C Solomon (ed), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary 
Philosophers on Emotions (Oxford University Press, 2003). 
3  See Magda Arnold, Emotion and Personality (Columbia University Press, 
1960); Nico Frijda, The Emotions (Cambridge University Press, 1986); Richard 
S Lazarus, ‘Cognition and Motivation in Emotion’ (1991) 46 American 
Psychologist 362. 
4  See Antonio Damasio, Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human 
Brain (1994); Antonio Damasio, ‘William James and the Modern 
Neurobiology of Emotion’ in Dylan Evans and Pierre Cruse (eds), Emotion, 
Evolution, and Rationality (Oxford University Press, 2004); Antoine Bechara, 
Hanna Damasio and Antonio Damasio, ‘Emotion, Decision Making and the 
Orbital Cortex’ (2000) 10 (3) Cerebral Cortex 295; Antoine Bechara, ‘The 
Role of Emotion in Decision-Making: Evidence From Neurological Patients 
with Orbitofrontal Damage’ (2004) 55 Brain and Cognition 30. 
5  See for example Kathryn Abrams and Hila Keren, ‘Who’s Afraid of Law and 
Emotions?’ (2010) 94 Minnesota Law Review 1997; Susan Bandes (ed), The
Passions of Law, (New York University Press, 1999); Terry A Maroney, ‘Law 
and Emotion: A Proposed Taxonomy of an Emerging Field’ (2006) Law and 
Human Behaviour 119; Eric A Posner, ‘Law and Emotion’ June (2001) 
Georgetown Law Journal 1; Erin Ryan, ‘The Discourse Beneath: Emotional 
Epistemology in Legal Deliberation and Negotiation’ (2005) 10 Harvard
Negotiation Law Review 231. 
6  See for example Paul Maharg and Caroline Maughan (eds), Affect and Legal 
Education: Emotion in Learning and Teaching the Law (Ashgate, 2011); 
Andrew H Benjamin et al, ‘The Role of Legal Education in Producing 
Psychological Distress Among Law Students and Lawyers’ (1986) 11 (2) 
American Bar Foundation Research Journal 225; Laurel Fletcher and Harvey 
M Weinstein, ‘When Students Lose Perspective: Clinical Supervision and the 
Management of Empathy’ (2002-2003) 9 Clinical Law Review 135; Kristen B 
Gerdy, ‘Clients, Empathy, and Compassion: Introducing First Year Students to 
the Heart of Lawyering’ (2008-2009) 87 Nebraska Law Review 1; Gerald F 
Hess, ‘Heads and Hearts: The Teaching and Learning Environment in Law 
School (2002) 52 Journal of Legal Education 75; Ann Juergens, ‘Practicing 
What We Teach: The Importance of Emotion and Community Connection in 
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academy’s reception of this scholarship as ‘ambivalent’, and insist 
that this attitude is ‘at sharp odds with its pragmatic potential’.
7
Peter Goodrich argues that this attitude arises because subjective 
considerations such as emotion are not valued and recognised in 
the legal domain, because they are considered as belonging to ‘a 
realm outside of law’.
8
Legal training teaches the subject to separate the personal and the 
legal, demanding the repression of emotion and the privileging of the 
objectivity of rules over the subjectivities of the truth – Aristotle’s 
wisdom without desire.9
Legal training promotes objectivity because the validity of 
legal judgment is premised on the perception of unbiased and 
consistent application of the law. If emotion is repressed then legal 
judgment appears to be objective. Legal training achieves the 
appearance of objectivity, in part, through ‘legalism’, where 
abstract logical reasoning applied to rules is privileged over 
contextual, social or personal factors. The emphasis on objectivity, 
logic and legalism fosters the rational attributes of law students by 
attempting to separate them from their moral and subjective 
experiences.10
Legalism manifests in legal education in the emphasis upon 
teaching students to ‘think like a lawyer’.11 Teaching students to 
‘think like a lawyer’ has been described as the obligation of legal 
educators to ‘exorcise’ students’ subjectivity,12 and criticised as a 
Law Work and Law Teaching’ (2004-2005) 11 Clinical Law Review 413; 
Lawrence S Krieger, ‘The Inseparability of Professionalism and Personal 
Satisfaction: Perspectives on Values, Integrity and Happiness’ (2004-2005) 11 
Clinical Law Review 425; Alan Lerner, ‘Using our Brains: What Cognitive 
Science and Social Psychology Teach us About Teaching Law Students to 
Make Ethical, Professionally Responsible, Choices’ (2004) 23 Quinnipiac Law 
Review 643. 
7  Abrams and Keren, above n 5, 2033. 
8  Peter Goodrich, ‘Law in the Courts of Love: Andreas Capellanus and the 
Judgments of Love’ (1996) 48 (3) Stanford Law Review 633, 674. 
9  Ibid 675. 
10 Ysaiah Ross, Ethics in Law: Lawyers’ Responsibility and Accountability in 
Australia (Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 2005) 29. See also Dennis Turner, 
‘Infusing Ethical, Moral, and Religious Values into a Law School Curriculum: 
A Modest Proposal’ (1998-1999) 24 (2) University of Dayton Law Review 283, 
286; Caroline Maughan, ‘Why Study Emotion?’ in Maharg and Maughan, 
above n 6, 22-23. 
11  See Larry O Natt Gantt, ‘Deconstructing Thinking Like a Lawyer: Analysing 
the Cognitive Components of the Analytical Mind’ (2006-2007) 29 Campbell 
Law Review 413; Alexander Scherr, ‘Lawyers and Decisions: A Model of 
Practical Judgment’ (2002) 47 Villanova Law Review 161. 
12  Gerald B Wetlaufer, ‘Rhetoric and Its Denial in Legal Discourse’ (1990) 76 
Virginia Law Review 1545, 1577. See also Hess, above n 6; Note, ‘Making 
Docile Lawyers: An Essay on the Pacification of Law Students’ (1997-1998) 
111 Harvard Law Review 2027; Kennon M Sheldon and Lawrence S Krieger, 
‘Does Legal Education Have Undermining Effects on Law Students? 
Evaluating Changes in Motivation, Values, and Well-Being’ (2004) 22 
Behavioral Sciences and the Law 261. 
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process that ‘steals one’s soul’.13 According to Gerdy, the focus of 
legal educators on logic and critical thinking and the exclusion of 
emotional and humanistic concerns send the message that dealing 
with emotions and personality is inconsistent with legal thinking.14
This is problematic for Gerdy because if ‘thinking like a lawyer’ 
does not involve a human context, it is being taught in a vacuum 
where there is little discussion on how the law impacts on the lives 
and emotions of the people being discussed.15 This human context 
includes law students and their values and emotions.  
There is evidence that some Australian law students are 
concerned about and dissatisfied with this emphasis upon legalism. 
The student members of the Australian National University Law 
School Reform Committee published a report in 201016 in which 
students provided their opinions about their experience of legal 
education. One student stated that they felt ‘disillusioned by a lack 
of intellectual and emotional engagement’ and wanted legal 
education to ‘make space for people with different experiences, 
talents and forms of intelligence.’17 Another stated that ‘as we 
learn how to ‘think like lawyers’, let’s also cultivate our capacity 
to think like human beings’.18 Other students wanted the 
curriculum to include ‘deep ethical inquiry’.19 The students 
criticised the absence of opportunities to develop the personal 
skills required in lawyering, and ‘found there was little attention 
given to the development of empathy, personal morality and 
values.’20 The students identified the failure by their legal 
education to encourage subjective and humanistic concerns as 
affecting the quality of their education and their ability to develop 
professionally, personally and morally. 
The analytical framework of ‘thinking like a lawyer’ is relevant 
to legal-ethical judgment and decision-making because this is 
another form of problem-solving undertaken by lawyers. Burton 
has articulated a model of ‘thinking like a lawyer’ that explicitly 
identifies two sites where emotion is relevant: the personal 
intelligences and narrative intelligence. This model is briefly 
13 Fiona Cownie, ‘Alternative Values in Legal Education’ (2003) 6 (2) Legal 
Ethics 159, 159. 
14  Gerdy above n 6, 30. 
15  Ibid. See also Robert Granfield and Thomas Koenig, ‘“It’s Hard to be a Human 
Being and a Lawyer”: Young Attorneys and the Confrontation with Ethical 
Ambiguity in Legal Practice’ (2002-2003) 105 West Virginia Law Review 495, 
519-521. The authors conducted empirical research with law graduates and 
found that legal ethics courses ignored humanistic and contextual issues, 
reduced cases to their technical merits, and reduced ethics to compliance with 
professional standards of conduct. 
16  ANU Law School Reform Committee, ‘Breaking the Frozen Sea: The Case for 
Reforming Legal Education at the Australian National University’ (Law 
School Reform ANU Law Students Society, 2010). 
17  Ibid x.
18  Ibid v.
19  Ibid 4.  
20  Ibid 30. 
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outlined in Part II. The personal intelligences involve the 
psychological emotional intelligence frameworks of intrapersonal 
and interpersonal skills. The incorporation of emotional 
intelligence into the law curriculum is seen as an opportunity to 
strengthen the professionalism of lawyers21 and has been the 
subject of much academic interest.22 Part III focuses on the role of 
emotion in narrative intelligence and the relationship between 
personal intelligences and narrative intelligence. The teaching and 
learning strategies for the subjects Ethics and Professional 
Conduct and Evidence and Criminal Procedure are shown to 
demonstrate the kinds of emotional content that can be explored in 
conjunction with legal ethics. Cognitive philosophy is applied in 
these strategies to demonstrate how emotion within narratives can 
be the subject of analysis, and how lawyers use emotion to 
influence juror judgment. The article also considers whether, and 
in what circumstances, this is ethical.  
II THINKING AND FEELING LIKE A LAWYER
‘Thinking like a lawyer’ can be broadly understood to mean the 
ability to undertake legal problem solving. The traditional 
approach to teaching legal problem solving focuses primarily on 
the development of written and oral communication skills and 
analytical skills such as analogical, deductive and inductive 
reasoning. Academics are now, however, starting to expand the 
range of cognitive processes and analytical frameworks that 
underpin ‘thinking like a lawyer’.23 Some of these new frameworks 
draw upon scholarship examining less traditional forms of 
intelligence and the role of emotion. This scholarship is useful 
because it addresses issues that arise from a conception of 
professionalism which ignores or represses emotion, and expands 
the concept of ‘thinking like a lawyer’ to include emotion. For 
example, Scherr recognises that cognitive processes are important 
but emphasises the role of emotion and narrative in practical 
judgment. He argues that lawyering involves both legal and non-
legal realities but ‘little work has gone into what those non-legal 
21  John E Montgomery, ‘Incorporating Emotional Intelligence Concepts into 
Legal Education: Strengthening the Professionalism of Law Students’ (2007-
2008) 39 University of Toledo Law Review 323, 323. 
22  See for example Paul J Cain, ‘A First Step Toward Introducing Emotional 
Intelligence into the Law School Curriculum: The “Emotional Intelligence and 
the Clinic Student” Class’ (2003-2004) 14 Legal Education Review 1; Fletcher 
and Weinstein, above n 6; Marjorie A Silver, ‘Emotional Intelligence and 
Legal Education’ (1999) 5 (4) Psychology, Public Policy and Law 1173; 
Marjorie A Silver, ‘Love, Hate, and Other Emotional Interference in the 
Lawyer/Client Relationship’ (1999-2000) 6 Clinical Law Review 259; Barry 
Sullivan and Ellen S Podger, ‘Respect, Responsibility, and The Virtue of 
Introspection: An Essay on Professionalism in the Law School Environment’ 
(2001) 15 Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy 117. 
23  Gantt, above n 11. 
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realities might be’.24 Similarly, Burton contends that there has 
been a disproportionate focus on some lawyer intelligences, like 
rule-based inductive, deductive and categorical reasoning 
processes.25 To counteract this tendency, Burton calls for a greater 
focus on ‘multiple lawyering intelligences’,  a pedagogical 
construct ‘designed to expand the terms of reference for what it 
means to “think like a lawyer” and thereby foster good judgment 
in students’.26
Burton proposes the following lawyering intelligences model, 
which she describes as ‘a set of distinct yet interconnected 




4. narrative intelligence;  
5. the personal intelligences;31 and 
6. strategic intelligence.32
All six of the above intelligences are intellectual capacities and 
all are necessary to undertake effective legal problem-solving, 
reasoning and judgment.  
The focus of this article is upon the development of narrative 
intelligence. Narrative intelligence involves ‘structuring facts in 
the context of stories rather than in the context of legal rules, in an 
attempt to discover or demonstrate the meaning of the situation’.33
For example, narrative intelligence permits consideration of 
contextual factors such as moral, political and social 
considerations. Narrative intelligence embraces facets of human 
reaction and judgment such as emotion and empathy as well as 
issues of right and wrong.34 Lawyers use narrative reasoning to 
24  Scherr, above n 11, 229. 
25  Angela Olivia Burton, ‘Cultivating Ethical, Socially Responsible Lawyer 
Judgment: Introducing the Multiple Lawyering Intelligences Paradigm into the 
Clinical Setting’ (2004-2005) 11 Clinical Law Review 15, 15. 
26  Ibid. 
27  Ibid 25. 
28  Ibid 27. General characteristics of this form of intelligence include ‘sensitivity 
to the spoken and written word’ and ‘the ability to use language pragmatically’. 
29  Ibid 29. ‘Categorisation occurs when we order or classify concepts, people, 
things or events on the basis of significant generalisations or on patterns of 
difference and similarity.’ Cognitive psychologists see this and stereotyping as 
an essential way to process information and assign meaning. 
30  Ibid 33. Here legal educators typically emphasise inductive, deductive, and 
analogical reasoning. 
31  Ibid 38-41. These include intrapersonal and interpersonal intelligences. These 
intelligences shape our understanding of ourselves and others and relate to 
sensitivity to issues of personality, motivation, belief, values and emotion. 
32  Ibid 42. Lawyers use this form of intelligence when they imagine and generate 
alternative plans and choose the most effective course of action. 
33  Ibid 34. 
34  Ibid 37. 
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contextualise problems beyond legal rules, to gain an 
understanding of the perspective of their clients and others, and to 
construct stories that convey facts persuasively.  
Narrative intelligence has both cognitive and emotional 
content. The cognitive content of narrative intelligence provides a 
way of organising, interpreting, evaluating, elaborating, 
remembering, learning and communicating information. Scherr 
observes that in law, narrative ‘has a dense pedigree ... narrative 
centres lawyering’.35 Like Burton, Scherr claims that narrative 
provides ‘a cognitive frame for data’ and ‘a tissue of language 
through which decision-makers discern the certainty necessary for 
action’.36 Similarly, Graham and McJohn claim that stories are 
‘almost an ideal data structure for human cognition’ particularly in 
relation to learning and memory.37 Graham and McJohn also 
contend that moral reasoning is involved in legal reasoning and 
that this form of reasoning involves narrative intelligence.38 This is 
consistent with the research of the cognitive psychologists 
Rettinger and Hastie who argue that when making morally salient 
decisions, people undertake narrative processing (create stories) to 
identify, comprehend, evaluate and integrate material into a 
complex mental representation.39 This suggests that the narrative 
analytical framework employed in ‘thinking like a lawyer’ is 
relevant to legal-ethical judgment. Narrative intelligence provides 
coherence and is essential in the process of judgment leading to 
legal and ethical decisions. 
The following section is a detailed examination of the 
emotional content of narrative intelligence. 
III THE EMOTIONAL CONTENT OF NARRATIVE
INTELLIGENCE
Although Graham and McJohn, Burton, and Scherr recognise 
the role of emotion in narrative intelligence, none of them 
elaborates on it. For Burton, narratives embrace facets of human 
reaction and judgment such as emotion.40 Graham and McJohn 
observe that narratives convey emotive content effectively. They 
argue that cognitive science supports the contention that the 
emotive aspects of narratives make them easier to remember and 
also makes them more persuasive.41 For Scherr, narratives contain 
35  Scherr, above n 11, 231. 
36
Ibid 232. 
37  Lorie M Graham and Stephen M McJohn, ‘Cognition, Law, Stories’ (2009) 10 
(1) Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology 255, 282. 
38  Ibid 258. 
39  David A Rettinger and Reid Hastie, ‘Comprehension and Decision Making’ in 
Sandra L Schneider and James Shanteau (eds), Emerging Perspectives on 
Judgment and Decision Research (Cambridge University Press, 2003) 175. 
40  Burton, above n 25, 37. 
41  Graham and McJohn, above n 37, 283. 
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and express emotion and motivate the decision-maker toward 
choice and commitment to action.42 Scherr briefly considers 
cognitive philosophy, in particular the work of Nussbaum, to 
demonstrate that beliefs and emotions are related and are open to 
assessment and criticism.43 He concludes that awareness and 
appraisal of emotion forms a natural activity of practical judgment 
because it recognises that emotion influences choices.44 This 
section of the article expands upon two of these aspects of 
narrative intelligence: analysis of emotional narratives and the 
persuasive role of emotion in narrative intelligence. 
Narrative intelligence involves the ability to recognise and 
evaluate emotional preferences, perspectives, beliefs, values and 
dispositions because these factors can influence judgment. 
Emotion is involved in the process of evaluation; for example, 
empathy gets narrative judgment underway. The perceptive 
capacity to see the suffering of another is said to precede ‘the 
analytical, reflective and deliberative components of moral 
judgment’.45 In cognitive neuroscience, empirical studies have 
identified the neurological basis for narrative understanding of 
self.46 According to Nussbaum, narratives contain and express 
emotion and are essential in the process of practical reflection.47
Narratives evoke emotional activity and reveal the structure of an 
emotion allowing for the analysis of the emotional experience. 
Emotions can be appropriate or inappropriate and can influence 
judgment positively and negatively. It is necessary to examine the 
judgments contained in emotion to understand how they influence 
narrative judgment and choice.  
At the heart of contemporary cognitive theories of emotion is 
the notion that emotions are intellectual, and following the Stoics, 
cognitive theorists generally identify emotion with judgments or 
appraisals meaning affirmations or denials of propositions or 
appearances.48 Cognitive theorists contend that the mental 
evaluative process involved in emotion produces thoughts.49
According to Nussbaum the thought of the object, the belief about 
the object and the recognition of the object’s salience enables a 
42  Scherr, above n 11, 233. 
43  Ibid 237. 
44  Ibid. For a detailed account of love and ethics see Martha C Nussbaum, 
Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions (Cambridge University 
Press, 2001). 
45  Leslie Paul Thiele, The Heart of Judgment: Practical Wisdom, Neuroscience, 
and Narrative (Cambridge University Press, 2006) 183. 
46  Ibid 15. 
47  Martha C Nussbaum, ‘Narrative Emotions: Beckett’s Genealogy of Love’ 
(1988) 98 (2) Ethics 225, 236. 
48  See Nussbaum, above n 44; Jerome Neu, A Tear is an Intellectual Thing: The 
Meanings of Emotion (Oxford University Press, 2000); Robert Solomon, 
‘Emotions and Choice’ in Amelie Rorty (ed), Explaining Emotions (University 
of California Press, 1980). 
49  John Deigh, ‘Primitive Emotions’ in Solomon, above n 2, 10. 
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person to identify with the emotional experience and the object of 
the emotion.50 Emotional beliefs if true justify the emotion and if 
false invalidate the emotion, and as such they can assist or impede 
judgment.51 Whether an emotion is deemed appropriate or 
inappropriate depends on whether a person ‘gets the appraisals 
right, using a defensible theory of value’.52 Accordingly, cognitive 
theorists refute the view that emotion is antithetical to reason and 
seek to establish emotion’s role in rationality. These aspects of 
Nussbaum’s theory are elaborated on and applied below in the 
context of a description and evaluation of the embedding of the 
graduate attribute ‘ethics and professional responsibility’ into two 
subjects in the new curricula at UTS. 
A  Ethics and Professional Conduct: Analysing 
Emotional Narratives 
Ethics and Professional Conduct at UTS Law is a vocational 
subject in the Practical Legal Training (PLT) component of the 
degree.53 Following the curriculum review, the subject will from 
2014 become a first year foundational subject called Ethics, Law 
and Justice.54 The ethics program at UTS Law actively encourages 
students to consider legal ethics broadly, including the role of 
emotion and personal values in ethical decision-making. All of the 
subject learning objectives in Ethics and Professional Conduct
emphasise the ethics graduate attribute, and one of the subject 
learning objectives directly relates to emotional content in legal 
ethics:
Upon successful completion of this subject students should be able to: 
Consider the impact of personal values, emotions and morals in 
ethical decision-making.  
This learning objective is retained in the new subject Ethics, 
Law and Justice, and the content targeting the impact of emotions 
remains largely the same. The following teaching and learning 
strategy was devised for Ethics and Professional Conduct and the 
discussion focuses on how it was initiated in that subject.  
There are several topics within Ethics and Professional 
Conduct where the emotional content of ethics is explored. The 
topic ‘Professional and Personal Conduct’ provides an example of 
how law students can be educated about the impact of emotion on 
ethical judgment and decision-making. The lecture for this topic 
50 Martha C Nussbaum, ‘Emotions as Judgments of Value and Importance’ in 
Solomon, above n 2, 27-31. 
51  Cheshire Calhoun, ‘Subjectivity and Emotion’ in Solomon, above n 2, 116. 
52  Nussbaum, above n 44, 372. 
53  The qualification on completing PLT is a Graduate Certificate in Legal 
Practice. The format of this subject is a one hour lecture and a two hour 
seminar each week for twelve weeks. 
54  The format of this subject is a three hour seminar each week for twelve weeks. 
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considers when conduct can be both professional and personal and 
the resulting professional responsibility issues that can arise. In 
relation to personal conduct and emotion, the case of Legal
Practitioners Board v Morel55 has been used as an example of 
where love and personal relations with clients can lead to a 
criminal lawyer being struck off for professional misconduct. 
Other emotions are involved in legal practice, but it is rare for 
emotions like love to be considered in the context of professional 
judgment and practice.56
Morel has also been used as an exam question where students 
were asked to discuss the case with reference to values, emotions 
and morals and to explain how different standards and perspectives 
influence the ethical behaviour of lawyers and the decisions of 
courts and tribunals. This was consistent with the seminar 
materials where other cases that involved love were discussed. The 
following questions were used in relation to the cases of Legal 
Practitioners Complaints Committee v Pepe57 and Garde-Wilson v 
Legal Services Board:58
What was the basis for the determinations? 
What values, emotions and moral codes were present in the Tribunal’s 
determination? 
Do you think the determinations were reasonable? 
Where there any alternatives to the Tribunal’s decisions?  
The purpose of having students read and discuss the cases was 
to help them to understand the factors the disciplinary tribunals 
considered relevant and irrelevant to their determinations, 
including values, emotions and moral codes. However, the second 
question does not adequately prompt consideration of how love 
can be analysed within those legal narratives and how it impacts 
ethical judgment. The question encourages surface learning about 
the emotional content because it is framed in terms of identifying 
the emotions that were present. The questions place more focus on 
the Tribunal’s determination than on the broader ethical issues. In 
55  [2004] SASC 168; (2004) 88 SASR 541 (hereinafter Morel). 
56  For example, the emotions of criminal lawyers have been considered in the 
context of resentment / forgiveness, outrage, pain, revulsion and joy. See David
M Lerman, ‘Forgiveness in the Criminal Justice System: If It Belongs, Then 
Why Is It So Hard To Find?’ (1999-2000) 27 Fordham Urban Law Journal
1663; Derek A Denckla, ‘Forgiveness as a Problem-Solving Tool in the Courts: 
A Brief Response to the Panel on Forgiveness in Criminal Law’ (1999-2000) 
27 Fordham Urban Law Journal 1613; Abbe Smith, ‘Too Much Heart and Not 
Enough Heat: The Short Life and Fractured Ego of Empathic, Heroic Public 
Defender’ (2003-2004) 37 Davis Law Review 1203; Susan Bandes, ‘Repression 
and Denial in Criminal Lawyering’ (2006) 9 (2) Buffalo Law Review 339; 
Abbe Smith and William Montross, ‘The Calling of Criminal Defense’ (1998-
1999) 50 Mercer Law Review 443.
57  [2009] WASC 39. 
58  [2008] VSCA 43. 
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the foundational subject Ethics, Law and Justice there will be less 
focus on professional responsibility, as these questions will be 
changed to refocus the discussion toward broader ethical issues, 
including emotions and how these affect ethical judgment. Some 
of the proposed new seminar questions are included in the 
discussion of the seminar content below.  
In order to illustrate the emotional content of narrative 
intelligence and the way in which emotional content can be 
analysed, the case of Morel will again be used. This particular 
disciplinary case elicits a narrative of love and discloses how 
ethical judgment can be influenced by emotion. Morel was a 
criminal lawyer in South Australia who was struck off the Roll of 
Practitioners for deceptive and dishonest conduct. In 1989 she 
began a professional and personal relationship with a prisoner 
named McFarlane. They were married in 1990 and she ceased 
being his lawyer. They divorced in 1996 while McFarlane was still 
imprisoned. In 1997 Morel began a professional and personal 
relationship with another prisoner, Page. Morel lied to prison 
authorities, stating that she urgently needed to speak with Page 
about legal matters whereas in fact she wished to talk to him about 
personal matters. The prison authorities began monitoring Page’s 
conversations with Morel, during which he admitted assaulting 
another prisoner. Morel was banned from visiting Page because 
the prison authorities considered that she was using the privilege 
of legal visits to further her personal relationship with him. Despite 
this, Morel continued to act for Page in a professional capacity.  
This case is an example of personal and professional boundary 
violations by a legal practitioner. The analysis of the case that 
takes place in this part is not concerned with the breach of 
disciplinary rules. What is illustrated is how love within this 
narrative can be analysed for the purpose of demonstrating the 
influence of emotion on ethical judgment. There is limited 
information about the personal emotional narrative of Morel. 
However the psychologists report provides some insight into the 
narrative of love, and a salient aspect is as follows:  
She described in the past either not trusting people or trusting them 
too much. Ms Morel told me she is aware that she is a person who has 
a large capacity of empathy for others, a tendency to absorb other’s 
feelings and that this is what she has to be more careful about.  
Ms Morel told me she now realises she got into trouble with these 
boundary issues as she did not know herself well enough to have a 
definite set of protective values.59
The report discloses that Morel had a relationship with another 
prisoner who resided with her while he served a sentence in home 
detention. This took place after she was removed from the roll.  
59 Legal Practitioners Board v Morel [2004] SASC 168 [33]-[34]. 
_____________________________THINKING LIKE A LAWYER ETHICALLY    79 
In cognitive philosophy, narratives can reveal the meaning of 
the emotion.60 Exposing emotional narratives to analysis can lead 
to better judgment when assumptions, beliefs, dispositions and 
perceptions are scrutinised. Accordingly, narrative is the way we 
examine, evaluate and make sense of the emotional experience. 
Love is implied in the above narrative because of the intimate 
relationships Morel engaged in. Nussbaum states that love is an 
emotion but it is also a relationship and cannot be understood 
unless it is examined ‘as part of the complex fabric of a story that 
extends over time.’61 Understanding this ‘complex fabric’ exposes 
the habits and dispositions towards engaging in certain kinds of 
relationships and thinking about love in certain ways. The case 
provides an incomplete narrative of love and there is no way of 
knowing the full historical and psychological features of that 
narrative and therefore the emotional habits and dispositions of 
Morel. As such, the analysis does not purport to represent Morel’s 
actual motivations, thinking and feelings. The application of 
emotion theory provides a reading of the case that is speculative, 
but which illustrates the kinds of analysis that emotional narratives 
can be the subject of and which are suggestive of dispositions to 
think and act in certain ways.  
The philosopher Robert Solomon contends that complex 
emotions such as love ‘involve process and story’ and that the 
stories we tell are ‘important to the nature of love itself’.62
Different stories dictate different meanings of love, and if ‘love is 
a narrative, many of the wrong stories are told’.63 There could be 
unacknowledged reasons for love in relation to Morel’s 
relationships with prisoners. Solomon claims that unacknowledged 
reasons can be amongst the worst reasons for love.64 For example, 
people can enter into patterns and Solomon observes that there are 
several reasons for doing this. One reason is ‘the safety of such a 
relationship, the fact that it has built in limits of time and 
commitment’.65 This is arguable: Morel did marry McFarlane, 
suggesting commitment to that relationship, but Morel knew that 
she could not conduct both professional and personal relationships 
at the same time, thus placing limits on the ability to commit and 
the longevity of future relationships. The tendency to choose 
partners in prison while providing with legal representation 
60  Nussbaum, above n 47, 236. 
61  Nussbaum, above n 44, 473. 
62 Robert C Solomon, ‘The Passions: Philosophy and the Intelligence of 
Emotions’ Lecture Series Part One, The Teaching Company Limited 
Partnership, 2006, 14 < http://www.teachersyndicate.com/documents/oct/2010/ 
 TTC%20Guidebooks/Passions%20-%20Philosophy%20and%20the%20 
 Intelligence%20of%20Emotions.pdf>. See also Nussbaum, above n 47, 236. 
63  Solomon, above n 62. 
64  Robert C Solomon, About Love: Reinventing Romance for Our Times (Hackett 
Publishing Company, 2006) 156. 
65  Ibid 157. Solomon uses the example of a woman falling in love with married 
men. 
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suggests a certain safety in the knowledge that the men are 
dependant both professionally and personally. Morel eventually 
acknowledged this, stating: 
I understand I am responsible for both creating such dependencies and 
the damaging effect this need has had on my life and the life of the 
other person involved.66
Another unacknowledged reason for Morel’s love is that the 
loved one satisfies ‘more neurotic needs – the need to be punished 
or martyred, the desire to take care of a truly pathetic human 
being, the need to play God with someone’.67 This provides a way 
of understanding Morel’s ‘large capacity’ for empathy and 
absorbing the feelings of others and her own dependency in such 
relationships. The psychiatric review reported that Morel ‘tended 
to act in the role of a "rescuer" in relation to three prisoners’,68
indicating a misguided sense of empathy, sympathy or compassion 
that led to unethical behaviour. Empathy and sympathy are seen as 
‘other-suffering’ emotions.69 However, these emotions are not 
about absorbing the feelings of others70 and this highlights the 
need to develop appropriate emotional boundaries and detachment.  
Characteristic of sympathy is a belief that the suffering of the 
other can be alleviated, but acting in the role of rescuer suggests 
the possibility of Morel’s emotional needs surpassing the needs of 
the men she was involved with. Applying Nussbaum’s explanation 
of the evaluative properties of emotion demonstrates this point in 
theory.71 The perception of the object of the emotion (a person, 
thing or event) is intentional, in that the thought of the object 
results in the emotion and the way the object is thought of depends 
on the person’s interpretation of it. Emotions are further 
characterised by beliefs about and the value attached to the object. 
Nussbaum argues that emotional judgments are a subclass of value 
judgments72 and that not all beliefs are emotional. Emotional 
66 Legal Practitioners Board v Morel [2004] SASC 168 [22]. 
67  Solomon, above n 64, 157. 
68 Legal Practitioners Board v Morel [2004] SASC 168 [41]. 
69  Jonathan Haidt, ‘The Moral Emotions’ in Richard J Davidson, Klaus R Schere 
and H Hill Goldsmith, Handbook of Affective Sciences (Oxford University 
Press, 2002) 861. 
70  See Lauren Wispe, ‘The Distinction Between Sympathy and Empathy: To Call 
Forth a Concept, a Word is Needed’ (1986) 50 (2) Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology 314, 314; Douglas Chismar, ‘Empathy and Sympathy: The 
Important Difference’ (1988) 22 The Journal of Value Inquiry 257; Julien 
Deonna, ‘The Structure of Empathy’ (2007) 4 (1) Journal of Moral Philosophy
99. 
71  Nussbaum, above n 44, 27-31. 
72  Ibid 30 (fn 21). Nussbaum explains that as a subclass of value judgment 
emotions ‘pertain to objects that figure in the person’s own scheme of goals 
and projects – and, in central cases, to objects that are seen as not fully 
controlled by the person. There will therefore be other value judgments that 
won’t involve emotion.’ 
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beliefs are those that define the emotion and, if true, justify it.73
Thus, according to Nussbaum, the defining elements of an emotion 
are evaluative judgments based on intentionality, belief and value 
as related to the object of the emotion. 
In Morel the objects of sympathy and love are the prisoners. 
The objects are intentional; they could be simultaneously 
perceived as helpless (sympathy) and desirable (love). 
Underpinning sympathy is a belief that the men are suffering and 
their suffering can be alleviated. The suffering possibly pertains to 
their confinement and lack of intimacy. Love is based on beliefs 
about the qualities of the object and the qualities of romantic 
relationships. On the evidence above, the relationships could be 
characterised by beliefs about care of the vulnerable and 
dependency. However, in relation to the possibility of Morel’s 
emotional needs, the most important aspect is the value attached to 
the intentional perception and belief characteristics. The value 
perceived in the prisoners and the relationship means that they 
were important for the role they played in the practitioner’s life. 
This value relates to the perception and thought of the object: the 
perception of the prisoners as helpless and thoughts based on 
beliefs of dependency. In terms of helplessness the value is the 
thought that she is the one that can alleviate the suffering by being 
the rescuer. In this account the value of those relationships could 
be to the practitioner’s ego because dependency implies power and 
this also relates to the object’s desirability. The dependency 
seemingly allows Morel to trust the person she is having a 
relationship with, a significant issue, stated in the first quote 
above, also making them more desirable.  
It appears that the ‘wrong story’ about love is being told. In 
Morel the potential unexamined reasons for love and misguided 
sympathy had a negative impact on Morel’s professional judgment 
leading to unethical behaviour. Emotional self-awareness in this 
example means the ability to evaluate the emotional narrative in 
order to better understand how emotion influences ethical 
judgment and choice. In the quotes above there is some evidence 
of the practitioner evaluating her own emotional narrative, but 
overall it could be concluded that she lacked emotional self-
awareness and as a result both her personal and professional 
judgment was impaired leading to boundary violations. Morel 
identifies a large capacity for empathy as a reason for the boundary 
violations. Empathy is not a discrete emotion; it is an emotional 
process that can manifest in any emotion.74 Empathy involves 
73  Calhoun, above n 51, 116. 
74 June Price Tangney, Jeff Stuewig and Debra J Mashek, ‘Moral Emotions and 
Moral Behaviour’ (2007) 58 Annual Review of Psychology 345, 362; Rand J 
Gruen and Gerald Mendelsohn, ‘Emotional Responses to Affective Displays in 
Others: The Distinction between Empathy and Sympathy’ (1986) 51(3) 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 609, 609. 
82 LEGAL EDUCATION REVIEW _______________________________________ 
understanding and evaluating the emotion and experience of 
another person through an affective connection. However there 
needs to be a balance between having a sufficient degree of 
empathy (engagement) and a sufficient degree of detachment 
(objectivity).75 When there is too much objectivity, empathy can be 
inhibited leading to a lack of understanding of the other person. 
When there is too much engagement, boundary violations can 
occur.
The balance between engagement and detachment is necessary 
in order to prevent problems such as counter-transference. 
Counter-transference is a Freudian concept and means 
‘unharnessed emotions – emotional responses gone awry... 
counter-transference may manifest itself in a variety of ways, as 
positive (love) or negative (hate)’.76 In the current context it means 
the misplaced emotions of a lawyer on a client,77 and occurs when 
there is an insufficient degree of detachment. Morel appears to be 
an example of counter-transference where too much empathic 
engagement manifested as love and led to boundary violations. 
Having emotional self-awareness enables a balance to be struck 
between engagement and detachment. Emotional self-awareness is 
the ability to recognise emotional responses and account for them 
in the lawyer/client relationship.78 Emotional self-awareness is not 
only acknowledging feeling a certain way. Perception of feelings 
is important, but emotional self-awareness is also about 
acknowledging traits, habits of thought and action, examining the 
beliefs that underpin emotion, and educating emotional 
capabilities.79 This is why it is important to emphasise the 
emotional aspects of legal practice with students and to provide 
them with opportunities to consider their own emotional 
capabilities with respect to ethical judgment. 
Proposed seminar questions and discussion points drawing 
upon the material above include the following: 
1. Morel knew that she could not enter both professional and 
personal relationships with clients. What do you think her 
motivations were for entering these relationships? 
75  Nigel Duncan, ‘Addressing Emotions in Preparing Ethical Lawyers’ in Maharg 
and Maughan, above n 6, 268. 
76  Silver, ‘Love, Hate, and Other Emotional Interference in the Lawyer/Client 
Relationship’, above n 22, 271. 
77  Ibid 270. See also Susan Daicoff, ‘Law as a Healing Profession: The 
Comprehensive Law Movement’ (2006) 6 Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law 
Journal 1. 
78  Silver, ‘Love, Hate, and Other Emotional Interference in the Lawyer/Client 
Relationship’, above n 22, 276. 
79  Peter Goldie, The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration (Oxford University 
Press, 2000) 118. See also Amelie Oksenberg Rorty, ‘Explaining Emotions’ 
(1978) 75 (3) The Journal of Philosophy 139. 
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2. Apart from empathy, love is implied in Morel. What does the 
legal narrative reveal about the meaning of empathy and love 
in this situation? 
3. The psychiatric review reported that Morel ‘tended to act in the 
role of “rescuer” in relation to the prisoners.’ How are 
sympathy and love related in this case? What does this indicate 
about having empathy or sympathy for clients?  
4. A balance needs to be struck between empathic engagement 
and emotional detachment. Do you agree or disagree with this 
statement? Why / why not?  
5. What is emotional self-awareness? What does the case of 
Morel indicate about emotional self-awareness? Is emotional 
self-awareness related to personal and professional judgment? 
6. What are the implications when practitioners do not account 
for their emotion in ethical judgment? 
These proposed seminar questions and discussion points are 
intended to examine the relationship between appropriate 
emotional detachment and self-awareness, how emotion can affect 
the lawyer/client relationship, how emotion can be analysed, and 
how emotion that is unaccounted for can lead to boundary 
violations. In participating in a seminar discussion, students will be 
engaging their narrative intelligence and exposing the emotions 
within the narratives to analysis. Students will be required to read 
the case and unless students are required to read some of the 
theoretical material, academics will need to guide and participate 
in the discussion by providing background information or asking 
further questions. 
Emotional self-awareness assists in striking a balance between 
empathic engagement and detached objectivity.80 Legal educators 
should encourage and develop the capacity of empathy in students 
but also encourage students to develop appropriate detachment in 
order to avoid problems such as counter-transference. Analysing 
legal narratives such as Morel is one way to expose students to 
emotional analysis. Narrative intelligence requires a capacity for 
emotional self-awareness, and with this capacity, people are more 
likely to approach and make judgments in a rational and ethical 
manner. This teaching and learning strategy is consistent with the 
learning objective because the aim is to develop awareness and 
skills that equip students to understand the impact of emotions on 
ethical judgment. The danger, however, is that this will reinforce 
attitudes that discount emotion leading to its repression or denial 
when making judgments. This is why it is important to emphasise 
the importance of emotional self-awareness. Appropriate 
emotional detachment does not simply mean acknowledging 
emotion and then attempting to exclude it from judgment. 
Appropriate emotional detachment requires emotional self-
80  Duncan, above n 75, 268.  
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awareness and the ability to acknowledge, moderate and account 
for the negative and positive influences of emotion on judgment. 
B  Evidence and Criminal Procedure: Using Emotion 
Persuasively and Ethically 
From 2014, the ‘ethics’ graduate attribute will also be 
embedded within the core subject Evidence and Criminal 
Procedure. The following is a proposed teaching and learning 
strategy that pertains to the ethics of using emotion persuasively 
and whether emotional judgments are morally justifiable.  
The relevant subject learning objective is as follows: 
Upon successful completion of this subject students should be able to: 
Evaluate and reflect on the roles of lawyers in the administration of 
justice. 
This learning objective focuses on the roles of lawyers and 
provides the opportunity to discuss the ethics of advocacy and how 
lawyers use emotion to influence juror decision- making. The 
learning objective is not explicit about the role of emotion in legal 
ethics, but the subject matter is wide enough to incorporate that 
knowledge. For example, the subject allocates a seminar to types 
of privilege such as client legal privilege, the professional 
confidential relationships privilege and the sexual assault 
communications privilege.81 In relation to the latter two privileges, 
the subject matter involves the history leading up to the enactment 
of those privileges and the law itself. There is ample scope within 
that material relating to those two privileges to discuss legal 
ethical content and the related emotional content. One aspect of the 
emotional and ethical content is discussed below, but this material 
also raises other ethical issues such as the moral character of 
lawyers and role-detachment.82
The learning strategy proposed below has three purposes: to 
understand the evaluative properties of emotion, to understand 
how emotion is used persuasively and strategically by lawyers, and 
to consider whether the use of emotion is morally justifiable and 
ethically defensible. In doing so, students are engaging narrative 
intelligence by critically analysing and reflecting on the role of 
emotion in legal-ethical judgment through an aspect of how 
lawyers may enact their role in the administration of justice. 
Proposed seminar questions follow the discussion of the seminar 
content below. 
81  The format of this subject is a ninety minute lecture and a ninety minute 
seminar each week for twelve weeks. 
82  For a discussion of these issues see Donald Nicholson and Julian S Webb, 
Professional Legal Ethics: Critical Interrogations (Oxford University Press, 
1999) 160-181. 
_____________________________THINKING LIKE A LAWYER ETHICALLY    85 
One of the prescribed readings for the seminar is an article by 
Mary Rose Liverani explaining the circumstances and the reasons 
why law reform was needed in relation to the subpoenaing of 
sexual assault counsellors’ notes.83 Lawyers in New South Wales 
were subpoenaing the notes in order to gain information that could 
be used to undermine the credibility of sexual assault 
complainants. Liverani discusses how some lawyers subverted the 
rape shield laws prior to the sexual assault communications 
privilege. Rape shield laws disallow lawyers from adducing 
evidence of the sexual reputation of the complainant to discredit 
them.84 In order to subvert these laws, some lawyers started to 
subpoena counselling notes for the purpose of indirectly 
introducing evidence of the complainant’s moral character.85 The 
purpose of this strategy was to discredit the credibility of the 
complainant and to affect juror judgment.86 In relation to using 
emotion to affect juror judgment and decision-making, lawyers 
could use information from counselling notes to support 
stereotypes and encourage jurors to act on biases. For example, 
Liverani quotes research by the Cossins and Pilkington87 who 
found that jurors: 
were less likely to believe in a defendant’s guilt when the victim had 
reportedly engaged in sex outside marriage, drank or used drugs, or 
had been acquainted with the defendant – however briefly.88
This research was published in 1996 and whilst some 
stereotypes and myths pertaining to sexual assault complainants 
have been exposed, it remains the case that some people who 
could be jurors adhere to those stereotypes or, in the least, are 
biased by the suggestion that the moral character of the 
complainant is dubious. Some lawyers have wanted access to 
counselling notes because they contain information including ‘past 
sexual history, the existence of illegitimate children, drug, alcohol 
and psychiatric history’ and self-blame.89 Lawyers could use this 
information to support stereotypes, to distort the factual nature of 
the sexual assault and to impeach the moral character of the 
complainant.90 In doing so they create a narrative91 and use the 
83  Mary Rose Liverani, ‘Confidential Communications: Support for New 
Subpoena Law and Bouquets for the Attorney General from Sexual Assault 
Lobby’ (1998) 36 (3) Law Society Journal 42. 
84 Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW), s 293. 
85  Liverani, above n 83, 44. 
86  Ibid. 
87  Annie Cossins and Ruth Pilkinton, ‘Balancing the Scales: The Case for the 
 Inadmissibility of Counselling Records in Sexual Assault Trials’ (1996) 19 
University of New South Wales Law Journal 222. 
88  Liverani, above n 83, 44. 
89  Ibid. 
90  Ibid. 
91  For an examination of the socio-linguistic characteristics of storytelling in 
court, and how storytelling is managed and organized by lawyers, see Diana 
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persuasive influence of emotion to direct the attention of jurors 
away from the moral obloquy of the defendant and toward 
impeachment of the moral character of the complainant. If jurors 
think that the complainant has a dubious moral character, they may 
sympathise with the accused and feel disdain towards the 
complainant. Emotions commonly attached to disdain are 
contempt and anger. For brevity, only contempt is considered 
below. Contempt also arises in the content and promotes 
consideration of the ethical justifiability of using emotion 
persuasively.92
Contempt is related to anger and moral disgust.93 Some 
theorists argue that contempt is a blend of these emotions, while 
others argue that these emotions are distinguishable from 
contempt.94 Contempt involves a judgment about a moral or 
character defect in another person. As such, contempt involves 
‘looking down on someone and feeling morally superior’ and is 
‘elicited by the perception that another person does not measure 
up’.95 This can result in the object of contempt being treated with 
less respect and consideration or with derision or disregard.96
Contempt is not always a negative emotion. Mason argues that in 
some situations contempt is understandable and morally 
justifiable. Mason prefers to refer to contempt as an attitude 
because of its quality as a form of regard that also involves an 
affective stance toward the other.97 Feeling contempt involves 
perceiving and regarding the object as a person who ranks low in 
their worth because they fall short ‘of some legitimate 
interpersonal’. The affective quality is feeling pained in the 
presence of the object thus making the object a source of 
Eades, ‘Telling and Retelling Your Story in Court: Questions, Assumptions, 
and Intercultural Implications’ (Paper presented at Cultures and the Law, 
Australasian Institute of Judicial Administration, 25th Annual Conference, 
Melbourne, Sunday 14 October 2007). See also Diana Eades, Sociolinguistics 
and the Legal Process (Multilingual Matters, 2010) 42-46. 
92  For the defining features and moral justifiability of anger see Gabriele Taylor, 
‘Justifying the Emotions’ (1975) 84 (1) Mind 390; Aristotle, Rhetoric, Book II 
Part 1, translated by W Rhys Roberts (The Internet Classics Archive) 
<http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/rhetoric.2.ii.html>. 
93  As a basic emotion disgust relates to revulsion of contaminates in the 
environment and as a moral emotion it contains a judgment about the 
degrading behaviour of another person.  
94  For empirical research on the differentials of anger, disgust and contempt, and 
a review of the psychological literature, see Cendri A Hutcherson and James J 
Gross, ‘The Moral Emotions: A Social-Functionalist Account of Anger, 
Disgust and Contempt’ (2011) 100 (4) Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology 719. 
95  Haidt, above n 69, 858. See also Kate Abramson, ‘A Sentimentalist’s Defense 
of Contempt, Shame and Disdain’ in Peter Goldie (ed), The Oxford Handbook 
of Philosophy of Emotion (Oxford University Press, 2010). 
96  Haidt, above n 69, 858. 
97  Michelle Mason, ‘Contempt as a Moral Attitude’ (2003) 113 (2) Ethics 234, 
239. 
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aversion.98 According to Mason the conditions necessary for 
contempt’s proper focus and moral justifiability are as follows: 
1. It is directed at a person or persons (objects) as a response to 
violations of a legitimate interpersonal ideal. The object does 
not have to commit a personal offense against the person; the 
offense can be based on a belief about a class of people. 
2. The violation stems from a morally evaluable character trait.  
3. The object can appropriately be held responsible for the 
expression of the character trait. 
4. There is a legitimate expectation or demand that the object can 
approximate the interpersonal ideal. 
5. The attitude toward the object emanates from an agent who 
does not possess a similar fault otherwise they are also 
contemptible. 
6. The agent is responsive to evidence that the object has repented 
or changed for the better thus being open to forgiveness or 
some other change in attitude. To be blind to that evidence 
would be a morally objectionable attitude. 
All of the above conditions and justifications contain 
evaluations. Conditions 1 to 4 relate to the conditions necessary for 
the proper evaluative presentation of the object of contempt.99
Conditions 5 and 6 relate to the moral justifiability of contempt.100
The agent evaluates the object in relation to their actions, character 
traits and responsibility. In doing so the agent is also evaluating 
their standards, how the object does not meet them, and their 
beliefs toward the object and situation.  
To appreciate the evaluative properties of contempt and its 
moral justifiability, students can be instructed to consider the 
following hypothetical: 
The defendant (D) contends that they had consensual sexual 
intercourse with the complainant (C). A juror (J) thinks that D could 
have made an honest mistake about a belief in consent because C 
engaged D in conversation, was dressed provocatively, had allowed D 
to buy drinks, had been flirting with D, and accepted a lift home with 
D. Additionally, C did not scream or struggle during the alleged 
sexual assault. D’s lawyer has deliberately introduced this evidence 
with the aim of influencing the juror’s perception of C. As a result J 
feels contempt toward C.  
In relation to Mason’s first point above, in order to ascertain 
whether there has been a violation of a legitimate interpersonal 
ideal, it is necessary to examine the possible beliefs that underpin 
the interpersonal ideal and the perception of C. The beliefs that 
98  Ibid 241; see also Macalister Bell, Hard Feelings: The Moral Psychology of 
Contempt (Oxford University Press, 2013) 57. 
99  Mason, above n 97, 250. 
100 Ibid 253. 
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could arise are that C invited the advance or if C did not want to 
have sexual intercourse C would have objected by screaming or 
struggling. The evaluations involved in these beliefs lead J to 
conclude that C is either lying or D has a reasonable belief in 
consent. Contempt toward C is attached to these evaluations. 
Further evaluation of the beliefs underpinning the emotion could 
reveal that the beliefs are based on  stereotypes or a biases and this 
would invalidate the contempt. This however, requires the honest 
appraisal of one’s beliefs. Without this kind of examination J 
considers that C has violated an ideal. The interpersonal ideal 
could be the thought that C is lying, that C should not have invited 
the advance, or that it was reasonable in the circumstances for D to 
believe there was consent. The interpersonal ideal could be based 
on misconceptions about sexual assault complainants and perhaps 
normative standards and perceptions related to the gender and the 
sexuality of the complainant. This calls into question the 
legitimacy of the ideal and the moral systems and norms that it is 
based on. 
In relation to Mason’s second and third points, J may consider 
the violation to have stemmed from a morally evaluable character 
trait. This would be the beliefs that C invited the advance or if C 
did not want to have sexual intercourse C would have objected. 
This element depends on the personal morality and perspective of 
J and the acceptance or rejection of information which contradicts 
the beliefs above. If C is lying then C would appropriately be held 
responsible for the expression of the character trait. However, 
whether the other beliefs raise morally questionable traits and 
whether C should be held responsible is debatable. The above 
beliefs could be based on stereotypes and attitudes that blame the 
complainant. Similarly, in relation to point four, J may consider 
that there is a legitimate expectation or demand that C can 
approximate the interpersonal ideal. That is, people should not 
flirt, accept drinks, dress provocatively, or accept lifts home, and 
should communicate non-consent clearly, because otherwise they 
are blurring boundaries. In those circumstances it is considered 
reasonable that D believed there was consent and this offends the 
interpersonal ideal. But again this ideal is problematic for the 
reasons above and because it adopts a moral standard that is not 
reflected in the law. For example, in New South Wales, when 
determining whether consent was ‘freely and voluntarily’ given, 
submission or a lack of resistance does not constitute consent.101
Moral standards do not have to be reflected in the law and people 
apply different norms and standards of behaviour depending on 
their moral and cultural perspectives. This is why some lawyers try 
to invoke negative emotions like contempt by reinforcing 
stereotypes in order to bias juror decision-making.  
101 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 61HA (7). 
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Whether the emotion is morally justifiable depends on Mason’s 
points five and six above. J could argue that the attitude toward the 
complainant is justifiable because they do not possess a similar 
fault. However, this depends on whether the evaluations J has 
made, based on their beliefs, are correct. If J’s evaluations are 
questionable or incorrect because their beliefs are biased or based 
on stereotypes, their attitude could be considered contemptible, 
particularly if they are unwilling to change. J also needs to be 
responsive to evidence that the object of the emotion, in this 
example the complainant, has repented or changed for the better 
thus being open to forgiveness or some other change in attitude. 
To be blind to that evidence would be a morally objectionable 
attitude. In the hypothetical this will again depend on whether J 
gets the evaluation right and, if they get it wrong, whether J is 
willing to accept that C does not need to repent or change. If J's 
evaluations are wrong it means that the contempt is not morally 
justifiable. 
The following seminar questions are based on the above 
content, the purpose of which is to elicit an analysis of contempt 
and the ethics of using emotion persuasively. 
1. What was the purpose of subpoenaing sexual assault counsellor 
notes? 
2. How was the information in the notes used? 
3. How might this information affect the way the jury perceives 
the complainant? 
4. Apply the six evaluations in Mason’s theory of contempt to the 
hypothetical (see above), to determine whether the juror’s 
attitude toward the complainant is proper and morally 
justifiable. Based on your analysis, do you think what D’s 
lawyer did by introducing the evidence was ethical? Why / why 
not? Is that situation different from using information in 
counselling notes? Why / why not? 
Questions 1 to 3 require students to identify and contextualise 
the problem of using the information in counselling notes to 
induce emotions such as contempt in the jury. The analysis above 
demonstrates how an answer to question 4 could be addressed by 
applying Mason’s theory of contempt. In relation to question 4, 
Mason’s six evaluative points could be shown to students so that 
they can work through them in the class discussion. The purpose 
of these questions is to engage students in an analysis of contempt, 
and to increase understanding of the evaluative nature of the 
emotion and its moral and ethical justifiability. 
The idea for this teaching and learning strategy came from two 
student responses on an internet discussion board for the subject. 
In the subject students are actively encouraged to engage in 
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discussion based on books102 about the criminal trial process in 
Australia and documentaries such as ‘The Staircase’ and ‘The 
Staircase 2: The Last Chance’. ‘The Staircase’ documents the trial 
of Michael Petersen, who was charged and convicted for the 
murder of his wife in the United States. ‘The Staircase 2’ 
documents his appeal and his subsequent release from prison 
pending a new trial. Student A commented on ‘The Staircase’ and 
student B on ‘The Staircase 2’. The students recognised that 
emotion plays a role in the criminal justice system. Student A 
explicitly discussed emotion and its influence on juries but found it 
‘interesting/alarming’ that emotion and human psychology has so 
much to do with jury decisions. Student B acknowledged that 
‘lawyers play on the emotions of juries’ and that it is ‘hard for 
juries to isolate their emotion.’ It is assumed that student B meant 
that jurors should not let emotion affect their decision-making.  
‘Lawyers play on emotion’ precisely because it is difficult for 
people to be unaffected by emotion for better or worse. This is 
why it is important to educate students about the responsibility of 
doing so and how it can be done ethically. If students continue to 
think that law, legal actors and legal judgment are free from 
emotion they are not learning about the reality of human decision-
making or ethical persuasion. The content of this teaching and 
learning strategy is consistent with the subject learning objective 
because it focuses on the roles of lawyers in the administration of 
justice. By using a concrete example of how a lawyer can enact 
their role in the administration of justice, this activity requires 
students to critique the fulfilment of that role in the context of 
ethical behaviour. Additionally, students are engaging their 
narrative intelligence through a consideration of how lawyers 
control and construct narratives. This activity exposes students to 
the reality of advocacy and the tactics, including the use of 
emotion to influence juror decision-making, employed by lawyers. 
The purpose is to encourage students to evaluate the impacts of 
employing these tactics and the potential harm it can cause, and to 
encourage reflection on appropriate ethical boundaries.  
IV CONCLUSION
This article argues that emotional, moral and humanistic 
concerns are not inconsistent with legal thinking and ethical 
judgment.103 Emotion is situated within legal analytic and problem 
102  For example Helen Garner, Joe Cinque’s Consolation (Pan Macmillan, 2004); 
John Bryson, Evil Angels (Penguin, 1986); Malcolm Knox, Secrets of a Jury 
Room (Random House, 2005); Paul Sheehan, Girls Like You (Pan Macmillan, 
2006). 
103  Cownie, above n 13, 159; Andrew Boon, ‘Ethics in Legal Education and 
Training: Four Reports, Three Jurisdictions and a Prospectus’ (2002) 5 (1 & 2) 
Legal Ethics 34; Karen Barton and Fiona Westwood, ‘Developing Professional 
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solving structures utilised in exercising legal judgment, in 
particular narrative intelligence and the personal intelligences. 
This article focuses on aspects of emotion within narrative 
intelligence because this is a relatively neglected area in legal 
education scholarship. Additionally, this article has sought to 
address the perceived failure in legal education to include the 
subjective and humanistic concerns involved in legal ethics. In 
relation to this problem, Gray suggests that the process of legal 
education and legal academics’ attitude to legal education require 
new ways of thinking.104 It is for this reason that this article has 
sought to demonstrate that emotion can be implemented in legal 
ethics education by utilising the existing analytical framework of 
‘thinking like a lawyer’.  
Narrative intelligence involves the ability to recognise and 
evaluate emotional preferences, perspectives, beliefs, values and 
dispositions because these factors influence judgment. 
Accordingly, a component of narrative intelligence is the way 
people examine, evaluate and make sense of emotional 
experiences. Emotionally self-aware people subject their emotional 
narratives to analysis to examine and evaluate their experiences.105
The legal narrative of Morel is used to demonstrate how an 
emotional narrative can be analysed. Elements of Solomon’s 
narrative theory of love are applied to show how a lack of 
emotional self-awareness led to boundary violations and unethical 
behaviour. Nussbaum’s theory on the evaluative properties of 
emotion is applied to better understand how Morel’s need to be a 
rescuer and her prioritisation of this need exposed habits and 
dispositions to think and act on love in certain ways which led to 
the ‘wrong story’ of love being told. Morel is an example of how a 
lack of emotional self-awareness impaired the practitioner’s 
personal and professional judgment. Self-awareness can be 
developed through acknowledging and evaluating personal 
emotional narratives and acknowledging how and when emotion is 
involved in broader narratives. Understanding emotion within 
these narratives can reveal what is important, what is valued and 
how emotion impacts on judgment. 
Contempt is used in this article to demonstrate how lawyers use 
emotion persuasively and to ascertain whether emotional 
judgments are morally justifiable. Contempt involves the 
perception that the object has violated an interpersonal ideal and 
Character: Trust, Values and Learning’ in Maharg and Maughan, above n 6, 
235-256; Duncan, above n 75, 257-282. 
104  James Gray, ‘Thawing out the Law School: Why We Need Legal Education 
Theory’ (2012) 37 (3) Alternative Law Journal 171, 174. See also Michael 
Coper, ‘Legal Knowledge, The Responsibility of Lawyers, and the Task of 
Law Schools’ (2007-2008) 39 University of Toledo Law Review 251. 
105 Silver, ‘Love, Hate, and Other Emotional Interference in the Lawyer/Client 
Relationship’ above n 22, 274-275. See also Michael Lacewing, ‘Emotional 
Self-Awareness and Ethical Deliberation’ (2005) 18 (1) Ratio 65. 
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the evaluation of the object as having a morally evaluable 
character trait. Further, contempt involves evaluations about moral 
and personal standards, expectations and responsibility. The object 
of the teaching and learning strategy is for students to engage in a 
structured and thorough analysis of an emotion. This has three 
purposes: to understand the evaluative properties of emotion, to 
understand how emotion is used strategically by lawyers, and to 
consider whether the emotion is morally justifiable and ethically 
defensible. The Liverani article used in the subject Evidence and 
Criminal Procedure is not explicit about emotion, nor are many of 
the other resources used in legal ethics education. However, this 
example demonstrates that academics can use existing materials 
and with further analysis reveal emotional content. Incorporating 
emotional knowledge within legal ethics education also requires 
willingness on the part of academics to become more informed 
about the different ways in which emotion is involved in ethics and 
to incorporate knowledge from other disciplines.  
The teaching and learning strategies outlined in this article are 
not especially innovative in terms of class discussions. However, 
the emotional content of those strategies enable students to think 
about legal ethics more broadly. It is argued that integrating 
emotion into learning how to ‘think like a lawyer’ will improve 
analytical skills and ethical judgment, and better prepare law 
students for the reality of making ethical judgments in legal 
practice.
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